We motivate, define and construct quantum proofs of knowledge, proofs of knowledge secure against quantum adversaries. Our constructions are based on a new quantum rewinding technique that allows us to extract witnesses in many classical proofs of knowledge. We give criteria under which a classical proof of knowledge is a quantum proof of knowledge. Combining our results with Watrous' results on quantum zeroknowledge, we show that there are zero-knowledge quantum proofs of knowledge for all languages in NP.
Introduction
Cryptographic protocols, with few exceptions, are based on the assumption that certain problems are computationally hard. Typical examples include specific number-theoretic problems such as the difficulty of finding discrete logarithms, and general problems such as inverting one-way functions. It is well-known, however, that many such problems would become easy in the advent of quantum computers. Shor's algorithm [Sho94] , e.g., efficiently solves the discrete logarithm problem and allows to factor large integers. While quantum computers do not exist today, it is not unreasonable to expect quantum computers to be available in the future. To meet this threat, we need cryptographic protocols that are secure even in the presence of an adversary with a quantum computer. We stress that this does not necessarily imply that the protocol itself should make use of quantum technology; instead, it is preferable that the protocol itself can be easily implemented on today's readily-available classical computers.
Finding such quantum-secure protocols, however, is not trivial. Even when we have found suitable complexity-theoretic assumptions such as the hardness of certain lattice problems, a classical protocol based on these assumptions may fail to be secure against quantum computers. The reason for this is that many cryptographic proofs use a technique called rewinding. This technique requires that it is possible, when simulating some machine, to make snapshots of the state of that machine and then later to go back to that snapshot. As first observed by van de Graaf [vdG98] , classical rewinding-based proofs do not carry over to the quantum case. Two features unique to the quantum setting prohibit (naive) rewinding: The no-cloning theorem [WZ82] states that quantum-information cannot be copied, so we cannot make snapshots. Furthermore, measurements destroy information, so interacting with a simulated machine may destroy information that would be needed later.
This leads to the following observation: Even if a classical protocol is proven secure based on the hardness of some problem, and even if that problem is hard even for quantum computers, we have no guarantee that the protocol is secure against quantum computers. The reduction of the protocol's security to the problem's hardness may be based on inherently classical features such as the possibility of rewinding.
An example of a protocol construction that suffers from this difficulty are zeroknowledge proofs. Zero-knowledge proofs are interactive proofs with the special property that the verifier does not learn anything except the validity of the proven statement. Zero-knowledge proofs are inherently based on rewinding (at least as long as we do not assume additional trusted setup such as so-called common-reference strings). Yet, zeroknowledge proofs are one of the most powerful tools available to the cryptographer; a multitude of protocol constructions use zero-knowledge proofs. These protocol constructions cannot be proven secure without using rewinding. To resolve this issue, Watrous [Wat09] introduced a quantum rewinding technique. This technique allows to prove the quantum security of many common zero-knowledge proofs. One should note, however, that Watrous' technique is restricted to a specific type of rewinding: If we use Watrous' technique, whenever some machine rewinds another machine to an earlier point, the rewinding machine forgets everything it learned after that point (we call this oblivious rewinding). That is, we can only use Watrous' technique to backtrack if the rewinding machine made a mistake that should be corrected, but it cannot be used to collect and combine information from different branches of an execution.
Constructing quantum zero-knowledge proofs solves, however, only half of the problem. In many, if not most, applications of zero-knowledge proofs one needs zeroknowledge proofs of knowledge. A proof of knowledge [GMR85, BG93] is a proof system which does not only show the truth of a certain statement, but also that the prover knows a witness for that statement. This is made clearer by an example: Assume that Alice wishes to convince Bob that she (the prover) is in possession of a signature issued by some certification authority. For privacy reasons, Alice does not wish to reveal the signature itself. If Alice uses a zero-knowledge proof, she can only show the statement "there exists a signature with respect to the CA's public key". This does not, however, achieve anything: A signature always exists in a mathematical sense, even if it has never been computed. What Alice wishes to say is: "I know a signature with respect to the CA's public key." To prove such a statement, Alice needs a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge; a proof of knowledge would convince Bob that Alice indeed knows a witness, i.e., a signature. Very roughly, the definition of a proof of knowledge is the following: Whenever the prover can convince the verifier, one can extract the witness from the prover given oracle access to the prover. Here oracle access means that one can interact with the prover and rewind him. Thus, we have the same problem as in the case of quantum zero-knowledge proofs: To get proofs of knowledge that are secure against quantum adversaries, we need to use quantum rewinding. Unfortunately, Watrous' oblivious rewinding does not work here; proofs of knowledge use rewinding to produce two (or more) different protocol traces and compute the witness by combining the information from both traces. Thus, we are back to where we started: to make classical cryptographic protocols work in a quantum setting, we need (in many cases) quantum zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge, but we only have constructions for quantum zero-knowledge proofs.
Our contribution. We define and construct quantum proofs of knowledge. Our protocols are classical (i.e., honest parties do not use quantum computation or communication) but secure against quantum adversaries. Our constructions are based on a new quantum rewinding technique (different from Watrous' technique) that allows us to extract witnesses in many classical proofs of knowledge. We give criteria under which a classical proof of knowledge is a quantum proof of knowledge. Combining our results with Watrous' results on zero-knowledge, we can show that there are zero-knowledge quantum proofs of knowledge for all languages in NP.
Organization. In Section 1.1, we give an overview over the techniques underlying our results. In Section 2 we present and discuss the definition of quantum proofs of knowledge (QPoKs). In Section 3, we give criteria under which a proof system is a QPoK. In Section 4, we show that zero-knowledge QPoKs exist for all languages in NP.
Our techniques
Defining proofs of knowledge. In the classical setting, proofs of knowledge are defined as follows: 1 A proof system consisting of a prover P and a verifier V is a proof of knowledge (PoK) with knowledge error κ if there is a polynomial-time machine K (the extractor) such that the following holds: For any prover P * , if P * convinces V with probability Pr V ≥ κ, then K P * (the extractor K with rewinding black-box access to P * ) outputs a witness with probability Pr K ≥ 1 p (Pr V − κ) d for some polynomial p and constant d > 0. In order to transfer this definition to the quantum setting, we need to specify what it means that K has quantum rewinding black-box access to P * . We choose the following definition: Let U denote the unitary transformation describing one activation of P * . K may invoke U (this corresponds to running P * ), he may invoke the inverse U † of U (this corresponds to rewinding P * by one activation), and he may read/write a shared register N for exchanging messages with P * . But K may not make snapshots of the state of P * . Allowing K to invoke U † is justified by the fact that all quantum circuits are reversible; given a circuit for U , we can efficiently apply U † . Note that previous black-box constructions such as Watrous' rewinding technique and Grover's algorithm [Gro96] make use of this fact. We can now define quantum proofs of knowledge: (P, V) is a quantum proof of knowledge (QPoK) with knowledge error κ iff there is a polynomial-time quantum algorithm K such that for all malicious provers P * , K P * (the extractor K with quantum rewinding black-box access) outputs a witness with probability Pr K ≥ 1 p (Pr V − κ) d for some polynomial p and constant d > 0. We illustrate that QPoKs according to this definition are indeed useful for analyzing cryptographic protocols. Assume the following toy protocol: In phase 1, a certification authority (CA) signs the pair (Alice, a) where a is Alice's age. In phase 2, Alice uses a zero-knowledge QPoK with negligible knowledge error κ to prove to Bob that she possesses a signature σ on (Alice, a ′ ) for some a ′ ≥ 21. That is, a witness in this QPoK would consist of an integer a ′ ≥ 21 and a signature σ on (Alice, a ′ ) with respect to the CA's public key. We can now show that, if Alice is underage, i.e., if a < 21, Bob accepts the QPoK only with negligible probability: Assume that Bob accepts with non-negligible probability ν. Then, by the definition of QPoKs, K Alice will, with probability 1 p (ν − κ) d , output an integer a ′ ≥ 21 and a (forged) signature σ on (Alice, a ′ ) with respect to the CA's public key (given the information learned in phase 1 as auxiliary input). Notice that 1 p (ν − κ) d is non-negligible. However, the CA only signed (Alice, a) with a < 21. This implies that K Alice can produce with non-negligible probability a valid signature of a message that has never been signed by the CA. This contradicts the security of the signature scheme (assuming, e.g., existential unforgeability [GMR88] ). This shows the security of our toy protocol.
Amplification. Our toy example shows that QPoKs with negligible knowledge error can be used to show the security of protocols. But what about QPoKs with non-negligible knowledge error? In the classical case, we know that the knowledge error of a PoK can be made exponentially small by sequential repetition. Fortunately, this result carries over to the quantum case; its proof follows the same lines.
Elementary constructions. In order to understand our constructions of QPoKs, let us first revisit a common method for constructing classical PoKs. Assume a protocol that consists of three messages: the commitment (sent by the prover), the challenge (picked from a set C and sent by the verifier), and the response (sent by prover). Assume that there is an efficient algorithm K 0 that computes a witness given two conversations with the same commitment but different challenges; this property is called special soundness. Then we can construct the following (classical) extractor K: K P * runs P * using a random challenge ch. Then K P * rewinds P * to the point after it produced the commitment, and then K P * runs P * with a random challenge ch ′ . If both executions lead to an accepting conversation, and ch = ch ′ , K 0 can compute a witness. The probability of getting two accepting conversations can be shown to be Pr 2 V , where Pr V is the probability of the verifier accepting P * 's proof. From this, a simple calculation shows that the knowledge error of the protocol is 1/#C.
If we directly translate this approach to the quantum setting, we end up with the following extractor: K runs one step of P * , measures the commitment com, provides a random challenge ch, runs the second step of P * , measures the response, runs the inverse of the second step of P * , provides a random challenge ch ′ , runs the second step of P * , and measures the response resp ′ . If ch = ch ′ , and both (com, ch, resp) and (com, ch ′ , resp ′ ) are accepting conversations, then we get a witness using K 0 . We call this extractor the canonical extractor. The problem is to bound the probability F of getting two accepting conversations. In the classical setting, one uses that the two conversations are essentially independent (given a fixed commitment), and each of them is, from the point of view of P * , the same as an interaction with the honest verifier V. In the quantum setting, this is not the case. Measuring resp disturbs the state of P * ; we hence cannot make any statement about the probability that the second conversation is accepting.
How can we solve this problem? Note that we cannot use Watrous' oblivious rewinding since we need to remember both responses resp and resp ′ from two different execution paths of P * . Instead, we observe that, the more information we measure in the first conversation (i.e., the longer resp is), the more we destroy the state of P * used in the second conversation. Conversely, if would measure only one bit, the disturbance of P * 's state would be small enough to still get a sufficiently high success probability. But if resp would contain only one bit, it would clearly be too short to be of any use for K 0 . Yet, it turns out that this conflict can be resolved: In order not to disturb P * 's state, we only need that the resp information-theoretically contains little information. For K 0 , however, even an information-theoretically determined resp is still useful; it might, for example, reveal a value which P * was already committed to. To make use of this observation, we introduce an additional condition on our proof systems, strict soundness. A proof system has strict soundness if for any commitment and challenge, there is at most one response that makes the conversation accepting. Given a proof system with special and strict soundness, we can show that measuring resp does not disturb P * 's state too much; the canonical extractor is successful with probability approximately Pr 3 V . A precise cal-culation shows that a proof system with special and strict soundness has knowledge error 1/ √ #C.
QPoKs for all languages in NP. Blum [Blu86] presents a classical zero-knowledge PoK for showing the knowledge of a Hamiltonian cycle. Using a suitable commitment scheme (it should have the property that the opening information is uniquely determined by the commitment), the proof system is easily seen to have special and strict soundness, thus it is a QPoK. By sequential repetition, we get a QPoK for Hamiltonian cycles. Using the Watrous' results, we get that the QPoK is also zero-knowledge. Using the fact that the Hamiltonian cycle problem is NP-complete, we get zero-knowledge QPoKs for all languages in NP.
Preliminaries
General. A non-negative function µ is called negligible if for all c > 0 and all sufficiently large k, µ(k) < k −c . A non-negative function µ is non-negligible if it is not negligible. ⊕ denotes the XOR operation on bitstrings. E[X] denotes the expected value of X. #C is the cardinality of the set C.
Quantum systems. We can only give a terse overview over the formalism used in quantum computing. For a thorough introduction, we recommend the textbook by Nielsen and Chuang [NC00, Chap. 1-2]. A (pure) state in a quantum system is described by a unit vector |Φ in some Hilbert space H. We always assume a designated orthonormal basis for each Hilbert space, called the computational basis. The tensor product of several states (describing a joint system) is written |Φ ⊗ |Ψ . We write Ψ| for the linear transformation mapping |Φ to the scalar product Ψ|Φ . The norm |Φ is defined as Φ|Φ . A unit vector is a vector with |Φ = 1. The Hermitean transpose of a linear operator A is written A † . A is called positive if A = A † and Φ|A|Φ ≥ 0 for all |Φ . The operator norm of A is |||A||| := sup |Φ A|Φ with |Φ ranging over unit vectors; we call A bounded if |||A||| exists.
Quantum Proofs of Knowledge

Definitions
Interactive machines. Intuitively, an interactive quantum machine M (machine, for short) is a machine that maintains two quantum registers, a register S for the internal state of M, and a register N for sending and receiving messages (the network register). Upon each activation, M expects some message in N , and the state of the preceding invocation in S. After the activation, S contains the new state of M, and N contains the message that M sends. A machine M can get both a classical input x and a quantum input |Φ . For simplicity, we assume that the number of messages a machine sends and receives is determined by the classical input. The quantum input is initially stored in S. More formally, a quantum machine is described by a family of quantum circuits (M x ) x∈{0,1} * and a family of integers (r M x ) x∈{0,1} * . M x determines the unitary operation that is performed on the quantum registers S and N , and r M x determines the number of messages. Note that all our machines perform only unitary operations. This does not, however, constitute a restriction since a machine with measurements can be transformed into a unitary machine by a standard purification argument. We call a machine M polynomial-time if the circuit M x has polynomial-size in |x|, r M x is polynomially-bounded in |x|, and the circuit's description can be computed in deterministic polynomial time given x.
Execution of interactive machines. Given a pair of machines M and M ′ , a pair of quantum states |Φ and |Φ ′ , and a pair of classical bitstrings x, x ′ ∈ {0, 1} * , we define the execution M(x, |Φ ), M ′ (x ′ , |Φ ′ ) by the following process: Initialize quantum registers S, S ′ , N with |Φ , |Φ ′ , |0 , respectively. Alternatingly, apply the circuit M x to S, N and the circuit M ′ x ′ to S ′ , N . Stop applying M x after r M x applications and stop applying
is the classical output of M ′ in an interaction where M is activated first. Often, we will omit the quantum input |Φ or |Φ ′ . In this case, we assume the input |0 .
Oracle algorithms with rewinding. An quantum oracle algorithm A is an algorithm that has access to a quantum interactive machine that is given as an oracle. Besides its own (classical) input x, the algorithm gets access to an interactive quantum machine M running on classical input x ′ and quantum input |Φ . We allow A to provide messages to and read messages from M x ′ and to execute the (unitary) quantum circuit M x ′ that describes M. Furthermore, A may execute the inverse of M x ′ , this corresponds to the classical notion of rewinding the machine M. We also allow that A is in a superposition between executing M x ′ and not executing it. Formally, a quantum oracle algorithm A is described by a family of circuits (A x ) x∈{0,1} * operating on three quantum registers S A , N and S M . (S A and S M contain the states of A and M, respectively. N is used for communication between A and M.) The circuit A x may contain normal gates (from some fixed universal set of gates) operating on S A and N , as well as two special gates and † . (These represent an application of the oracle given to A.) Both operate on one qubit of S A (the control qubit) and on the whole of N , S M . We define an execution A M(x ′ ,|Φ ) (x) as follows: Initialize S A , N, S M with |0 , |0 , |Φ . Execute the circuit A x . When the gate is to be applied on C, N, S M where C is a qubit in S A , apply the unitary transformation U defined by U (|0 ⊗|ψ ⊗|ϕ ) := |0 ⊗|ψ ⊗|ϕ and U (|1 ⊗|ψ ⊗|ϕ ) := |1 ⊗M x ′ (|ψ ⊗|ϕ ) where M x ′ is the unitary transformation describing one activation of M. (Intuitively, M x ′ is applied if C contains |1 .) The gate † is treated analogously, except that we use M † x ′ instead of M x ′ . Finally, we measure S A in the computational basis. The random variable A M(x ′ ,|Φ ) (x) describes the outcome of that measurement. We call an algorithm A polynomial-time if the circuit A x has polynomial-size in |x| and its description can be x ′ do not match, it may happen that the circuit of one machine is executed several times in a row after the other machine already stopped.
computed in deterministic polynomial time given x.
Proof systems. A quantum proof system for a relation R is a pair of two machines (P, V). We call P the prover and V the verifier. The prover expects a classical input (x, w) with (x, w) ∈ R, the verifier expects only the input x. We call (P, V) complete if there is a negligible function µ such that for all (x, w) ∈ R, we have that Pr[ P(x, w), V(x) = 1] ≥ 1 − µ(|x|). (Remember that, if we do not explicitly specify a quantum input, we assume the quantum input |0 .) Although we allow P and V to be quantum machines, and in particular to send and receive quantum messages, we will not need this property in the following; all protocols constructed in this paper will consist of classical machines. We call a (P, V) sound with soundness error s iff for all malicious prover P * , all auxiliary inputs |Φ , and all x with ∄w : (x, w) ∈ R, we have Pr[ P * (x, |Φ ), V(x) = 1] ≤ s(|x|). A proof system is computational zero-knowledge iff for all polynomial-time verifiers V * there is a polynomial-time machine S (the simulator) such that for all auxiliary inputs |Φ , and all (x, w) ∈ R, we have that the quantum state of V * after an interaction P(x, w), V * (x, |Φ ) is computationally indistinguishable from the output of S(x, |Φ ); we refer to [Wat09] for details.
Quantum Proofs of Knowledge. We can now define quantum proofs of knowledge (QPoKs). Roughly, a quantum proof system (P, V) is a QPoK if there is a quantum oracle algorithm K (the extractor) that achieves the following: Whenever some malicious prover P * convinces V that a certain statement holds, the extractor K P * with oracle access to P * is able to return a witness. Here, we allow a certain knowledge error κ; if P * convinces V with a probability smaller than κ, we do not require anything. Furthermore, we also do not require that the success probability of K P * is as high as the success probability of P * ; instead, we only require that it is polynomially related. Finally, to facilitate the use of QPoKs as subprotocols, we give the malicious prover an auxiliary input |Φ . We get the following definition:
Definition 1 (Quantum Proofs of Knowledge) We call a proof system (P, V) for a relation R quantum extractable with knowledge error κ if there exists a constant d > 0, a polynomially-bounded function p > 0, and a polynomial-time quantum oracle machine K such that for any interactive quantum machine P * , any state |ψ , and any x ∈ {0, 1} * , we have that
A quantum proof of knowledge for R with knowledge error κ (QPoK, for short) is a complete quantum extractable proof system for R with knowledge error κ.
Note that extractability with knowledge error κ implies soundness with soundness error κ. We thus do not need to explicitly require soundness in Definition 1. The knowledge error κ can be made exponentially small by sequential repetition:
Discussion
In this section, we motivate various design choices made in the definition of QPoKs.
Unitary provers. We only require security against unitary malicious provers, that is, against provers that do not perform any measurements. This is because it is not clear how rewinding could even be defined (let alone used) in a setting where provers are allowed to perform measurements. Given a non-unitary prover, we cannot apply the inverse of the operation that models a single step of the prover (since the prover does not perform a reversible computation), but we also cannot make snapshots of the execution (since the prover maintains a quantum state). We stress, however, that any non-unitary prover can be transformed into a unitary one by purification before applying the definition of QPoKs. Thus allowing only unitary malicious provers does not seem to be a restriction.
On the success probability of the extractor. We require the extractor to run in polynomial-time and to succeed with probability [HM98] ) is that we can consider polynomial-time extractors (instead of expected polynomial-time extractors). To get extractors for B-style and C-style definitions, one has to increase the success probability of an extractor by repeatedly invoking it until it outputs a correct witness. In the quantum case, however, this does not work directly: If the invoked extractor fails once, the auxiliary input of the prover is destroyed. The oblivious rewinding technique by Watrous' would seem to help here, but when trying to apply that technique one gets the requirement that the invoked extractors' success probability must be independent of the auxiliary input. This condition is not necessarily fulfilled. To summarize, all three styles of definitions have their advantages, but it is not clear how one could fulfil B-and Cstyle definitions in the quantum case. This is why we chose an A-style definition. There are, however, applications that would benefit from a proof system fulfilling a C-style definition. For example, general multi-party computation protocols such as [GMW87] use extractors as part of the construction of the simulator for the multi-party computation; these extractors must then succeed with probability close to 1. Another example of a protocol needing C-style extractors is the proof for graph-non-isomorphism [GMW91] , see the discussion in [HM98] . We leave the construction of C-style QPoKs as an open problem.
Amplification
In some cases, elementary constructions only yield QPoKs with constant knowledge error κ. Yet, in most cases we need QPoKs with negligible knowledge error. One possibility to construct these is to sequentially iterate a QPoK with constant knowledge error, the knowledge error of the resulting QPoK then becomes exponentially small. This result is well-known in the classical case [BG93] ; the proof in the quantum case follows the same lines.
Theorem 2 Let n be a polynomially bounded and efficiently computable function. Let (P, V) be extractable with knowledge error κ. Let (P ′ , V ′ ) be the proof system consisting of n-sequential executions of (P, V). Then (P ′ , V ′ ) is extractable with knowledge error κ n .
Proof. We call (P, V) the atomic proof and (P ′ , V ′ ) the composed proof. Fix a malicious prover P * (that is supposed to interact with V ′ ), a statement x, and an auxiliary input |Φ for P * . In the execution of the composed proof with prover P * , we call each execution of the atomic proof a round. Without loss of generality, we can assume that P * consists of n sequentially executed provers P * i such that P * i executes the i-th round of the composed proof. For i ≥ 2, P * i expects as quantum input the state that was output by P * i−1 . Let K be the knowledge extractor for the atomic proof. We construct a knowledge extractor K ′ for the composed proof as follows: First, K ′ picks a random i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Then K ′ internally simulates the first i − 1 rounds of the composed proof (with provers P * 1 , . . . , P * i−1 ). Let |Φ ′ denote the state output by
and outputs w. 3 We fix the following notation: a i is the probability that the first i rounds of the composed proof succeed (with prover P * ). We stress that a i−1 is also the probability that in an execution of K ′ , the internal simulation of the first i−1 rounds succeeds. Let c i denote the probability that the i-th round of the composed proof succeeds, conditioned on the event that the first i − 1 rounds succeed. We have a 0 = 1 and a i = c i a i−1 for i = 1, . . . , n.
Let Pr K ′ denote the probability that K ′ succeeds (i.e., returns a witness), and let Pr V ′ denote the probability that the composed proof succeeds. Fix some i. Let Pr (i) K ′ denote the probability that K ′ succeeds, conditioned on the fact that K ′ chooses that i. Then, by construction of K ′ , we have that Pr
We will show that there exists an i (dependent on P * , |Φ , and x), as well as a polynomially-bounded p > 0 and an integer d > 0 (independent of i, P * , |Φ , and x) such that Pr
We proceed to bound Pr K (|Φ ′ ) denote the probability that K P * (x,|Φ ′ ) (x) succeeds (outputs a witness), and Pr V (|Φ ′ ) the probability that the atomic proof with prover P * and auxiliary input |Φ ′ succeeds. Then, the probability that K ′ succeeds, conditioned on the event that the first i − 1 rounds succeed, is E[Pr 
Since the atomic proof has knowledge error κ, there are a polynomially-bounded p > 0 and an integer d > 0 such that Pr
We stress that p and d are independent of i, P * , |Φ , and x. It follows that
Here ( * ) uses Jensen's inequality [Jen06] . Summarizing, at this point we know that Pr
that a i = c i a i−1 for all i, and that Pr V ′ = a n . Let δ := Pr V ′ −κ n . Assume that δ > 0, otherwise nothing need to be shown. Since a 0 = 1 and a n = Pr V ′ , we have that for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, a i−1 < κ i−1 + (i−1)δ n and a i ≥ κ i + iδ n . For that i, we have
and hence
Since pn d+1 is polynomially-bounded, it follows that the composed proof (P ′ , V ′ ) has knowledge error κ n .
Elementary constructions
In this section, we show that under certain conditions, a classical PoK is also a QPoK (i.e., secure against malicious quantum provers). The first condition refers to the outer form of the protocol; we require that the proof systems is a protocol with three messages (commitment, challenge, and response) with a public-coin verifier. Such protocols are called Σ-protocols. Furthermore, we require that the proof system has special soundness. This means that given two accepting conversations between prover and verifier that have the same commitment but different challenges, we can efficiently compute a witness. Σ-protocols with special soundness are well-studied in the classical case; many efficient classical protocols with these properties exist. The third condition (strict soundness) is non-standard. We require that given the commitment and the challenge of a conversation, there is at most one response that would make the verifier accept. We require strict soundness to ensure that the response given by the prover does not contain too much information; measuring it will then not disturb the state of the prover too much. Not all known protocols have strict soundness (the proof for graph isomorphism [GMW91] is an example). Fortunately, many protocols do satisfy strict soundness; a slight variation of the proof for Hamiltonian cycles [Blu86] is an example (see Section 4). 
Definition 3 (Σ-protocol) A proof system (P, V) is called a Σ-protocol if
Definition 5 (Strict soundness) We say a Σ-protocol (P, V) has strict soundness if for any two accepting conversations (com, ch, resp) and (com, ch, resp ′ ) for x, we have that resp = resp ′ .
Canonical extractor. Let (P, V) be a Σ-protocol with special soundness and strict soundness. Let K 0 be the special extractor for that protocol. We define the canonical extractor K for (P, V). K will use measurements, even though our definition of quantum oracle algorithms only allows for unitary operations. This is only for the sake of presentation; by purifying K one can derive a unitary algorithm with the same properties. Given a malicious prover P * , K P * (x,|Φ ) (x) operates on two quantum registers N, S P * . N is used for communication with P * , and S P * is used for the state of P * . As described in the definition of quantum oracle machines, the registers N, S P * are initialized with |0 , |Φ . Let P * x denote the unitary transformation describing a single activation of P. First, K applies P * x to N, S P * . (This can be done using the special gate .) This corresponds to running the first step of P * ; in particular, N should now contain the commitment. Then K measures N in the computational basis; call the result com. Then K initializes N with |0 . Then K chooses uniformly random values ch, ch ′ ∈ C x . Let U ch denote the unitary transformation operating on N such that U ch |x = |x ⊕ ch . Then K applies P * x U ch . (Now N is expected to contain the response for challenge ch.) Then K measures N in the computational basis; call the result resp. Then K applies (P * x U ch ) † (we rewind the prover). Then P * x U ch ′ is applied. (Now N is expected to contain the response for challenge ch ′ .) Then N is measured in the computational basis; call the result resp ′ . Then (P * x U ch ′ ) † is applied. Finally, K outputs w := K 0 (x, com, ch, resp, ch ′ , resp ′ ). In the following, we will need the following theorem from [Kit97, Theorem 3]: 4 Theorem 6 If A 1 , . . . , A n are bounded positive operators, then |||
Analysis of the canonical extractor. In order to analyze the canonical extractor (Theorem 12 below), we first need a lemma that bounds the probability that two consecutive binary measurements P ch and P ch ′ with random ch = ch ′ succeed in terms of the probability that a single such measurement succeeds. In a classical setting (or in the case of commuting measurements), the answer is simple: the outcomes of the measurements are independent; thus the probability that two measurements succeed is the square of the probability that a single measurement succeeds. In the quantum case, however, the first measurement may disturb the state; this makes the analysis considerably more involved. To derive our bound, we prove a sequence of lemmas (Lemmas 7-10), each being a strengthening of the previous one.
Lemma 7 Let C be a set with #C = c and H a Hilbert space. Let |Ψ i ∈ H be a unit vector and
Proof.
Furthermore, by definition of |||·|||, we have that
where the maximum goes over all unit vectors |ξ . ( * ) uses the fact that |ξ :
Here ( * ) uses that P 2 i = P i and hence P 1/2 i = P i . ( * * ) uses Theorem 6 and the fact that orthogonal projectors are bounded and positive.
Moreover
With (1) 
By definition of D, we have that for all α ∈ [0, 1], D ≥ α 3 δ 2 α and thus δ α ≤ D 1/2 α −3/2 . We also have by definition that δ α ≤ 1. Notice that these two bounds coincide for α = D 1/3 . We have
Lemma 8 Let C be a set with #C = c. Let (P i ) i∈C be orthogonal projectors on a Hilbert space H. Let |Φ ∈ H be a unit vector. Let V := i∈C 1 c P i |Φ 2 and F := i,j∈C 1
Proof. Let ν i := P i |Φ , letĈ := {i ∈ C : ν i = 0}, and letĉ := #Ĉ. For i ∈ C, let |Ψ i := ν
Here ( * ) uses the fact that (1 − |Φ Φ|/ν 2 i ) is positive. Thus we get
Proof. Fix some n ∈ AE. Let C ′ := C n , c ′ := c n , and
27 and hence F ≥ V 3 27 1/n . Since this holds for all n, and
Lemma 10 Let C be a set with #C = c. Let (P i ) i∈C be orthogonal projectors on a Hilbert space H. Let |Φ ∈ H be a unit vector. Let V := i∈C 1 c P i |Φ 2 and E := i,j∈C,i =j 1
Proof. Let F be as in Lemma 9. Then
Here ( * ) uses that P i = P i P i since P i is a projection, and ( * * ) uses Lemma 9.
Lemma 11 Let C be a set with #C = 2. Let (P i ) i∈C be orthogonal projectors on a Hilbert space H. Let |Φ ∈ H be a unit vector. Let V := i∈C 1 c P i |Φ 2 and E := i,j∈C,i =j 1
Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume C = {0, 1}. We prove the lemma under the assumption that P 0 , P 1 have rank 1, i.e., P i = |Ψ i Ψ i | for some unit vectors |Ψ i . From this, one can derive the general statement with a proof completely analogous to that of Lemma 8. Let |Ψ ⊥ be a unit vector orthogonal to |Ψ 0 , |Ψ 1 such that |Φ ∈ span{|Ψ 0 , |Ψ 1 , |Ψ ⊥ }. (Such a vector can be found by projecting |Φ on the orthogonal complement of span{|Ψ 0 , |Ψ 1 }.) Then |Φ = α|Ψ 0 + β|Ψ 1 + γ|Ψ ⊥ for some α, β, γ ∈ . Let ε := Ψ 0 |Ψ 1 . (Intuitively, ε tells us how far |Ψ 0 and |Ψ 1 are from being orthogonal.) We further abbreviate η :=ᾱβε+αβε. Herex stands for the complex conjugate of x. Note that η/2 is the real part ofᾱβη and hence η ≤ 2|αβε|.
We have
Furthermore,
Similarly, P 1 |Φ 2 = Φ|Ψ 1 Ψ 1 |Φ = |β| 2 + |αε| 2 + η. Thus we have that
and 2V = |α| 2 + |β| 2 + |ε| 2 (|α| 2 + |β| 2 ) + 2η
If η ≥ 0, we have |α| 2 + |β| 2
≤ 1. From this we get |α|, |β| ≤ 1 and hence η ≤ 2|αβε| ≤ 2|ε|. Thus 2V ≤ 1 + |ε| 2 + 2|ε|. If η ≤ 0, we have 2V ≤ 1 + |ε| 2 (|α| 2 + |β| 2 ) + η We proceed to bound E:
Here ( * ) uses that P i are orthogonal projections and hence
2 ) 2 and the lemma follows.
Theorem 12 A Σ-protocol (P, V) for a relation R with special and strict soundness and challenge space C x is extractable with knowledge error Proof. To show that (P, V) is extractable, we will use the canonical extractor K. Fix a malicious prover P * , a statement x, and an auxiliary input |Φ . Let Pr V denote the probability that the verifier accepts when interacting with P * . Let Pr K denote the probability that K P * (x,|Φ ) (x) outputs some w with (x, w) ∈ R. We will show that
Since furthermore K is polynomial-time, this implies that (P, V) is a extractable with knowledge error Game 3. Before K measures resp, it first measures whether measuring resp would yield an accepting conversation. More precisely, it measures N with the orthogonal projector P ch projecting onto V ch := span{|resp : (com, ch, resp) is accepting}. Analogously for the measurement of resp ′ (using the projector P ch ′ .) Since a complete measurement (of resp and resp ′ , respectively) is performed on N after applying the measurement P ch and P ch ′ , introducing the additional measurements does not change the outcomes resp and resp ′ of these complete measurements, nor their post-measurement state. Game 6. We remove the measurements of resp and resp ′ . Note that the outcomes of these measurements are not used any more. Since (P, V) has strict soundness, V ch = span{|resp 0 } for a single value resp 0 (depending on com and ch, of course). Thus if the measurement P ch succeeds, the post-measurement state in N is |resp 0 . That is, the state in N is classical at this point. Thus, measuring N in the computational basis does not change the state. Hence, the measurement of resp does not change the state. Analogously for the measurement of resp ′ . It follows that Pr[Succ : Game 5] = Pr[Succ : Game 6].
Game 7. First, N and S P * are initialized with |0 and |Φ . Then the unitary transformation P * x is applied. Then com is measured (complete measurement on N ), and N is initialized to |0 . Random ch, ch ′ ∈ C x are chosen. Then P * x U ch is applied. Then the measurement P ch is performed. Then (P * x U ch ) † is applied. Then P * x U ch ′ is applied. Then the measurement P ch ′ is performed. Then (P * x U ch ′ ) † is applied. The event Succ holds if both measurements succeed. Games 6 and 7 are identical; we have just recapitulated the game for clarity. Thus, Pr[Succ : Game 6] = Pr[Succ : Game 7] .
In Game 7, for some value d, let p d denote the probability that com = d is measured. Let |Φ d denote the state of N, S P * after measuring com = d and initializing N with |0 . (I.e., the state directly before applying P * x U ch .) Let K d denote the probability that starting from state |Φ d , both measurements P ch and P ch ′ succeed. Let c := #C x . Then we have that Pr[Succ :
where P * ch := (P * x U ch ) † P ch (P * x U ch ). Since P ch is an orthogonal projector and P * x U ch is unitary, P * ch is an orthogonal projector. Let
, 1] and ϕ(v) := 0
Furthermore, by construction of the honest verifier V, we have that
where ( * ) uses that (P * x U ch ) † is unitary. Finally, we have
Here ( * ) uses Jensen's inequality [Jen06] and the fact that ϕ is convex on [0, 1]. As discussed in the beginning of the proof,
implies that (P, V) is a QPoK with knowledge error 1/ √ #C x . For the case #C x = 2, we define ϕ(v) := 
QPoKs for all languages in NP
In the preceding section, we have seen that complete proof systems with strict and special soundness are QPoKs. The question that remains to be asked is: do such proof systems, with the additional property of being zero-knowledge, exist for interesting languages? In this section, we will show that for any language in NP (more precisely, for any NPrelation), there is a zero-knowledge QPoK. (Assuming the existence of quantum oneway permutations.) Here and in the following, by zero-knowledge we mean quantum computational zero-knowledge.
The starting point for our construction will be the Blum's zero-knowledge PoK for Hamiltonian cycles [Blu86] . In this Σ-protocol, the prover's commits to the vertices of a graph using a perfectly binding commitment scheme. In the prover's response, some of these commitments are opened. That is, the response contains the opening information for some of the commitments. The problem is that standard definitions of commitment schemes do not guarantee that the opening information is unique; only the actual content of the commitment has to be determined by the commitment. This means that the prover's response is not unique. Thus, with a standard commitment scheme we do not get strict soundness. Instead we need a commitment scheme such that the sender of the commitment scheme is committed not only to the actual content of the commitment, but also to the opening information.
Definition 13 (Strict binding) A commitment scheme COM is a deterministic polynomial-time function taking two arguments a, y, the opening information a and the message y. We say COM is strictly binding if for all a, y, a ′ , y ′ with (a, y) = (a ′ , y ′ ), we have that COM(a, y) = COM(a ′ , y ′ ).
Inputs: A directed graph x (the statement) with vertices W , and a Hamiltonian cycle w in x (the witness). Subprotocols: A strictly binding, quantum computationally concealing commitment scheme COM. Protocol: 1. P picks a random permutation π on W . Let A be the adjacency matrix of the graph π(x). Let H := {(π(i), π(j)) : (i, j) ∈ w}. Using COM, P commits to π, H, and to each entry A ij of A. P sends the resulting commitments to V. 2. V picks ch ∈ {0, 1} and sends ch to P. 3. If ch = 0, P opens the commitments to π and A. If ch = 1, P opens the commitments to H and to all A ij with (i, j) ∈ H. 4. If ch = 0, V checks that the commitments are opened correctly, that π is a permutation, and that A is the adjacency matrix of π(x). If ch = 1, V checks that the commitments are opened correctly, that H is a cycle, that exactly the A ij with (i, j) ∈ H are opened, and that A ij = 1 for all (i, j) ∈ H. If all checks succeed, V outputs 1. Furthermore, in order to get the zero-knowledge property, we will need that our commitment schemes are quantum computationally concealing. We refer to [Wat09] for a precise definition of this property. In [AC02] , an unconditionally binding, quantum computationally concealing commitment scheme based on quantum one-way permutations is presented. Their definitions differ somewhat from those of [Wat09] , but as mentioned in [Wat09] , their proof carries over to the definitions from [Wat09] . Furthermore, in the scheme from [AC02] , the commitment contains the image of the opening information under a quantum one-way permutation. Thus the strict binding property is trivially fulfilled. Thus strictly binding, quantum computationally concealing commitment schemes exist under the assumption that quantum one-way permutations exist. Given such a commitment scheme COM, we construct the proof system (P, V) presented in Figure 1 . Besides using a strictly binding commitment, (P, V) differs in one other aspect from the proof system in [Blu86] : The prover does not only commit to the vertices in the graph π(x), but also to the permutation π and the cycle H. Without these additional commitments, we would not get strict soundness; there might be several permutations leading to the same graph, or the graph might contain several Hamiltonian cycles.
Theorem 14 Let (x, w) ∈ R iff w is a Hamiltonian cycles of the graph x. Assume that COM is a strictly binding, quantum computationally concealing commitment scheme. Then the proof system (P, V) is a zero-knowledge QPoK for R with knowledge error Proof. We need to show completeness, extractability (via special and strict soundness), and zero-knowledge. Completeness is straightforward by inspection of the protocol.
Special soundness. Let (com, ch, resp) and (com, ch ′ , resp ′ ) be two accepting conversations for x with ch = ch ′ . Without loss of generality, ch = 0 and ch ′ = 1. Then resp contains a permutation π and the adjacency matrix A of π(x). And resp ′ contains a cycle H such thatÃ ij = 1 for all (i, j) ∈ H whereÃ ij are the committed values opened in resp ′ . Since ch is strictly binding, 1 =Ã ij = A ij for all (i, j) ∈ H, thus H is a Hamiltonian cycle of π(x). Then w := K 0 (x, com, ch, resp, ch ′ , resp ′ ) := π −1 (H) is a Hamiltonian of x, i.e., (x, w) ∈ R.
Strict soundness. Fix an accepting conversation (com, ch, resp). If ch = 0, resp consists only of opening of commitments. Since COM has strict binding, it follows that resp is uniquely determined by com, ch. If ch = 1, COM consists of an opening of the commitment to H, and of the commitments to A ij with (i, j) ∈ H. Hence H and its opening information are uniquely determined since COM has strict binding, and thus it is also determined which A ij are opened. Again by strict binding, the values A ij and corresponding opening information are uniquely determined. Thus resp is uniquely determined by com, ch.
Extractability. Since (P, V) has special and strict soundness, and a challenge space of size 2, by Theorem 12, we have that (P, V) is extractable with knowledge error 1 2 . Zero-knowledge. We first describe an intermediate simulator S 1 . Fix a malicious verifier V * , some (x, w) ∈ R, and an auxiliary input |Φ . S V * (x,|Φ ) 1 (x) first picks a random ch * ∈ {0, 1}. If ch * = 0, S 1 chooses a random permutation π, computes the adjacency matrix A of π(x), and picks an arbitrary H. If ch * = 1, S 1 chooses an arbitrary permutation π, sets A to be the all-one matrix, and lets H be a random cycle. Then S 1 sends the commitments to π, A, H to V * . If V * does not answer with the challenge ch * , S 1 aborts. Otherwise, S 1 sends the response as specified in Figure 1 to V * . Finally, S 1 outputs the (quantum) output of V * .
Furthermore, let S 2 be the simulator that additionally gets w as input, and then behaves like S 1 except that it constructs π, A, H honestly (i.e., as specified in Figure 1 ). The probability that S 2 aborts is 1 2 . Furthermore, the quantum state output by S 2 , conditioned on not aborting, is the same as the output of V * in an interaction with honest P. Furthermore, since all commitments that are opened are constructed in the same way in S 1 and S 2 , and since COM is quantum computationally concealing, the outputs of S 1 and S 2 are quantum computationally indistinguishable. Thus the probability that S 2 aborts is 1 2 ± µ for some negligible µ, and the output of S 2 , conditioned on not aborting, is quantum computationally indistinguishable from the output of V * in an interaction with honest P.
Applying [Wat09, Lemma 9] (oblivious rewinding) to S 1 , we get that there is a polynomial-time simulator S such that the output S is statistically indistinguishable from the output of S 1 conditioned on not aborting. Thus the output of S is quantum computationally indistinguishable from the output of V * in an interaction with honest P. 
